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ABSTRACT 
In the past, research on password mechanisms has focussed 
almost entirely on technical issues. Only in recent years has the 
security research community acknowledged that user behavior 
plays a part in many security failures, and that policies alone may 
not be sufficient o ensure correct behavior. We argue that 
password mechanisms and their users form a socio-technical 
system, whose effectiveness relies strongly on users' willingness 
to make the extra effort that security-censcious behavior requires. 
In most organizations, users cannot be forced to comply; rather, 
they have to be persuaded to do so. Ultimately, the mechanisms 
themselves, policies, tutorials, training and the general discourse 
have to be designed with their persuasive power in mind. We 
present the results of a first study that can guide such persuasive 
efforts, and describe methods that can be used to persuade users to 
employ proper password practice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Password mechanisms are the first line of defense of most 
computer systems, and therefore affect almost every user on a 
daily basis. Research on security mechanisms in general has in the 
past focused almost exclusively on technical issues. Only in recent 
years has the security community recognized that user behavior is 
a part of many security failures, and sta~d to consider the effect 
of human factors in security (see, for example, [12,4,10,3]). [1] 
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and [9] havc shown that current password mechanisms have 
largely failed to consider usability, and that - given the increasing 
number of systems and passwords - most users cannot cope with 
the demands imposed on them. In addition, many users are not 
sufficiently educated about security issues. Thus, many usersm 
construct their own, often wildly inaccurate models of security 
threats and the importance and effective deployment of security 
measures. All this has led to • situation where a large number of 
users consistently behave in a manner that undermines the 
security of the systems they are using: they choose 
cryptographically weak passwords, write them down, and readily 
disclose them to other people. It is exactly these kinds of 
behaviors that are exploited by hackers and industrial spies, many 
of whom use social engineering [11,6]. 
We believe that the usability of password mechanisms will be 
improved, and that users will become better educated. However, 
even once this is achieved, there is an additional issue that needs 
to be addressed: the willingness of users to behave in accordance 
with proper password practice. In most cases, authentication to a 
system is an enabling task, which means it creates an overhead for 
the user, who is using that system as a tool to achieve a primary, 
real-world task. It is predictable that most users will cut comers 
to reduce that exlra load given a chance, unless they are motivated 
to make the effort to behave in a security-conscious fa hion - an 
argument [10] have put forward for security mechanisms in 
general. Oversimplifying for the sake of argument, users of 
password mechanisms can be divided into two groups: those that 
face personal damage if they do not behave in a security- 
conscions fashion,- and those that do not put themselves, but 
others, at risk by cutting corners. Self-employed and home users 
fall into the first category - users in this group can, if educated 
about the possible consequences of their behavior, make an 
informed choice about heir behavior, based on an assessment of 
the risks and the effort required to reduce these risks. Users in an 
organizational context fall into the second category, and for them 
education will very often not be sufficient. [9] found that users 
who had access to systems essential to the operations of their 
company - which had experienced a number of break-ins - had an 
attitude set towards security that could at best be labeled as 
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'unconcerned'.  Organizations put them~elvas at risk i f  they have 
employees with such attitude sets, which are likely to prevail even 
with further education. 
Work on computer security has always been s l~ng ly  influenced 
by its roots in the mil i tary environment, where users can be 
expected to comply with rules given to them. [1] demonslrated 
that this approach does not work in modern business organizations 
with skilled, empowered knowledge workers, who do not work 
under constant supervision and are supposed to use their own 
initiative. These users cannot be expected to comply with security 
practices that they perceive as obstacles on the path to getting 
their job done. They will be aware that it is impossible to monitor 
their password behavior constantly, e~d are therefore l ikely to 
ignore such rules. Ohe of  the studies in [9] found that the vast 
majority of  users did not fol low compe~ty rules for passwords. In 
many corporate nvironments, the highest-ranking executives are 
those least l ikely to comply with security rules because they 
"'don't have t/me" to bother with procedures that "get in the way 
o f  more important hings". Monituring staff closely to enforce 
compliance would be prohibit ively e:(pensive and unacceptable 
from a human resources point of  view. Since employees cannot 
simply be forced to comply, they have to be persuaded to do so. 
We believe that in the long run, any persuasive ffort will ouly be 
fully effective if the password mccharLisms are usable, integrated 
with real world tasks, and designed fTom the very beginning with 
their persuasive power in mind. However, in this paper we will  
present a first demonstration of 'p re~,  good persuasion' without 
changing the mechanisms. Some of  these methods rely on changes 
to the policies and the way they are enforced, and some rely 
purely on changing the discourse about passwords mechanisms, 
supported by a social marketing campaign. Ult imately,  only a 
combinat ion o f  all these method.,, wi l l  achieve max imum 
persuasive power. 
Our research was or ig inal ly  mot ivated by a s imple set o f  
questions. In large organizations, many users have similar jobs to 
do, and access in format ion  with the same degree o f  
confidentiality. How can it be that some of  them are motivated to 
behave in a security-couscious fashion, and others are not?. Is this 
due to general personality differences, or can it be trar~d back m 
their mental  constructs, e.g. their  knowledge,  bel iefs and 
attitudes? And if  it can be traced back to their mental conslructs, 
would it be possible to entice users who behave improperly to 
take on the constructs o f  users that 'behave well, thus changing 
their behavior?. In an initial investigation of  these questions, we 
carr ied out semi-structured in-depth interviews on password 
security with 17 part ic ipants.  Ten o f  these worked for a 
technology company, 6 were doctoral candidates, and one was a 
systems adminislzator working in a Bank. The interviews lasted 
30-80 minutes and were subsequently transcribed for analysis. 
Interviews (rather than questionnaires) were chosen in order to 
allow exploratory questioning, and si',ce it has been reported that 
a lot o f  people will answer questions on security in interviews that 
they will not answer in a questionnaip) [2]. We kept the interviews 
as open as possible, but were broadly guided by concepts taken 
from Rogers'  protection motivat ion theory [8]. The theory is 
concerned with the use o f  fear  appeals to change the behavior of  
people. It states that fear appeals wil l  be effective i f  they 
convince the recipient that 
1. the problem is serious; 
2. it may affect her/him; 
3. it can be avoided by taking appropriate action; and 
4. the recipient is capable o f  performing the necessary 
behavior equired to avoid the problem. 
We initially analyzed the interviews looking for beliefs, attitudes 
and knowledge items, but subsequently found the concept of  
interpretative repertoires (IR) extremely useful. Our use o f  this 
concept draws on Potter and Wetherei l 's  formulation of  discourse 
analysis [5], and its application in Human-Computer Interaction 
[7]. Discourse analysis argues that language conatructs reality, 
rather than representing or reflecting it. There is always more than 
one way to describe things, and our choice o f  how to describe 
particular aspects o f  reality has an immense power to shape the 
way we experience the world and behave in it. Interpretative 
repertoires are the shared l inguistic resources we draw on to 
c o ~  aspeu~f~ of reality. 
In analyzing the interviews, we made a number of  discoveries that 
we believe to be important for anybody wanting to persuade users 
in an organizational context to behave in a security-conseious 
fashion. Section two o f  the paper wil l  describe these findings in 
detail, but the following is a high-level summary: 
1. A large number o f  the participants in the interviews had 
mental constructs that make it almost impossible to use fear 
appeals effectively to change their behavior. The good news 
is that there were also a few part ic ipants with mental 
conswucts that can assist us in creating powerful fear appeals. 
2. We found that part ic ipants quite freely disclosed their 
passwords to other members o f  their organization. The 
interesting point is that there is a strong social element in 
sharing passwords - it is seen as a sign o f  trust among co- 
workers. In addition, the criteria for who to share with, and 
when, directly play into the hands o f  hackers, industrial spies 
and social engineers. 
3. Another way of  persuading users to behave properly would 
be an advertising approach of  associating 'posit ive qualities' 
with the desired behaviors. We found that, currently, the 
exact opposite is the case. People who behave in a security- 
conscious fashion ave often described as 'paranoid' - even by 
themselves. 
The third section o f  this paper, wil l  present initial ideas on solving 
these problems.  We are currently apply ing some of  these 
approaches to establ ish their effects, whi lst  the others are 
promising avenues for future research. In particular, we suggest a
three-tiered approach to address the current state of  affairs: 
1. In the short run, users' wil l ingness to comply with existing 
regulations can be improved by changing the discourse about 
password mechanisms, and by using techniques from social 
marketing. 
2. Where possible, additional changes to policies and the way 
they are enforced will increase compliance. 
3. Ult imately,  only  password mechanisms that have been 
designed with their 'persuasive power'  in mind will  achieve 
the maximum level o f  compliance, in conjunction with the 
previous two methods. 
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2. UNDERSTANDING USERS 
2.1 Who's Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf?. Why 
Conventional Fear Appeals Don't Work 
for Most Users 
In the inlxoduction, we stated the conditions that have to be met 
for a fear appeal to be successful. In this subsection, we will show 
that beliefs held by many participants, and the interpretative 
repertoires they draw on, mean they are effectively immune to 
conventional fear appeals because not all of the necessary 
conditions can be met_ 
2.1. I Who tries to get into other people's accounts 
- and why? 
The interpretative repertoires participants draw on to describe the 
people who try to break into other people's accounts, and their 
motivation to do so, bear a direct relation on whether they 
perceived themselves as likely targets for such attacks. The 
repertoires used by most participants lead them to believe that this 
likelihood was small, as will be shown in 2.2.2. 
The most prominent repertoire was kids 1, with vandals and 
criminals a distant second. The other repertoires reported here 
were only mentioned by individual participants. 
Kids were described as sad little kids (spotty little s***s, 
basically, that have nothing better to do than to fascinate 
themselves by writing programs about how to get into things 
which they're not supposed to.) or curious kids (Curiosity, just 
saying "This is secret, can I break into it. that would be furl '" 
Like, basically, kids playing around.). Some technically-minded 
participants even expressed a certain amount of admiration for 
them (Very technically literate, very capable technically, with a 
devious mind. [laughs].). Their motivation is to prove they can do 
it, to get a buzz, to get a sense of echievement, or to be better than 
someone lse and impress their friends. They target security- 
conscious organizations, prestigious ones~ or the rich and famous. 
Once they have broken into a system, they might deface a web 
page, or leave a message, but they don't do any serious harm. 
Vandals are seen as abnormal (I don't know how to describe 
them. They "re obviously not normal people.). They want to have a 
pop at the establishment or are just plain mad (but all the 
destructive stuff is like a cat burglar that's just having an episode 
in a place, you know, they lose their rag, they go completely mad 
and start racking the place, that seems a bit unnecessary to me). 
They have the same targets as kids, but unlike them, they do 
serious damage in the systems they break into. 
Criminals were seen almost exclusively as trying to carry out 
activities related to online banking - which none of the 
participants had direct access to from their company account - 
with only one participant considering the threat of their account 
being used as a base to commit fi-aud undetected. 
Vengeful people arc vengeful against s specific individual, 
whereas disgruntled employees want to get revenge on an 
organization. The final repertoires that appeared where industrial 
spies, terrorists, and jokers  (And they might even know the 
person that they're targeting, where it'x just a joke, where they 
I The special font denotes the interpretative repertoires. 
then send o f  an small purporting to come from some individual, 
saying outrageous things.). 
2.1 .2  Whom do they target? 
The likely targets for attackers are a direct result of the repertoires 
introduced above. The important point to make here is that none 
of the participants perceived themselves as falling under one of 
the repertoires that make up potential targets, except for the 
weakest link repertoire. Mostly, the targets are security- 
conscious organizations or high-profile organizations 
(They're high-profile. Some o f  those are supposed to be very 
secure, like the Pentagon is supposed to be unbeatable, so i f  you 
can get into that, it's like a big thing, a big macho-thing, but also 
i f  you tell your mates you hacked into some system that nobody 
has ever heard of, they won't be very impressed, however secure 
it was. They won't be very impressed. You hacked into X, who is 
X?. No-one's heard o f  them. so it's not very impressive.). In 
addition, people with important information arc targeted, as are 
people who have annoyed the attacker. Only few participants, 
and only after further questioning, drew on the weakest link 
repertoire (Ahh... yeah, probably not, ] think it's unlikely that 
anyone from outside would choose, you know, that their aim 
would be to get into specifically my account, but I think they could 
end up targeting me, you know, like I was saying, searching for a 
weak link in a corporate argani-, yeah, they want to get into some 
part of[company name)'s network, and l 'm one way in, so they 
might, I might get targeted in that sense.). 
2. I. 3 There is no personal danger 
As shown above, the likelihood of being targeted personally was 
seen as small by the participants. In addition, we could confirm 
the results of the previous tudies [1] and [9]: the severity of the 
negative consequences of someone breaking into the account is 
regarded as small as well. Participants did on the whole not 
believe that the information i their account was of importance or 
use to anybody (but, but I mean, the sort o f  information that you, 
that's passworded is not of  any interest o anybody. The number 
of  man-hours that have been working on my project, who cares? 
There are items there that are important to me, and that ! would 
know how to exploit hem, but i f  somebody had a look at them, I
think they would have great difficulty, first of  all, in understanding 
them, and secondly, finding a market for them.). 
In addition, anumber of mechanisms that organizations employ in 
order to reduce the possible negative consequences of break-ins 
directly lead to participants regarding the danger as less strong (Q: 
Would there be any potential harm to you personally? ,4: Only i f  
they send emails on my behalf, I think, that's the only scenario I 
could think of. They could destroy my work, but 1 use the 
mainframe as a backup, so everything that's on there is stored 
elsewhere anyway.). Participants in the commercial organization 
also showed a strong belief in the security of their Intranet (,,lh, 
perhaps not so important is, to me, is the passwords dealing with 
computing security in terms o f  files, fi le storing places because, 
mostly, because we're inside an intranet, it's mainly secure from 
outside.). 
2.1.4 Hackers can always find a way in 
We have shown that participants did not consider themselves as 
under threat. We also wanted to know whether they believed they 
could prevent someone from breaking into their system, and came 
across a repertoire that clearly diminishes that bel ief -  hackem 
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can always find a way in (Ahm, I think i f  somebody is 
determined nough to break into a system, they will exlzand the 
effort, either guessing the passwords or rampaging through bins 
to f ind  those torn-up envelopes or, or whatever. I think i f  
somebody is determined enough, they'l l  break in. [passwords] 
add another level to make it more difficult fo r  people who men 't 
particularly experienced toaccess your account.). 
2.1.5 Personal accountability 
We asked participants what they would do i f  their superior 
conYzonted them with the fact that someone had accessed other 
parts of  the system fxom their account, (~asing considerable harm 
to the organization. Most participants did not regard this as a 
problem, since they could always rely on the trust in me (people 
that know me personally would know .that I wouldn't do things 
like that) and the fact that passwords are not infallible (Ahm, 1 
mean, most. we work on, ah, in a coml~ny like (company name}, 
in such a big company, ahm, that sort o f  stuff  may happen, and 
people are aware that passwards are not infallible and therefore 
there is kl-nd o f  a, a trust among people, and I l l  said "I dktn 't do 
it" then I would expect people to i.~rust me, because, ahm, 
basically, the. the, it should be clear t t~t xystetns are not totally 
infallible and some systema can be compromised). 
2.2 Is There Hope? Why Fear Appeals Could 
Work Better for Some Users 
None of  the part icipants fol lowed :regulations on password 
securiW to the letter. However, some of  them made more of  an 
effort to behave in a manner that they  regarded as security- 
conscious, or at least were aware of  tile dangers to them of  not 
complying with regulations. The important point about the 
repertoires we present in this section is that some of  them are 
direct 'antidotes' to the ones presented in previous sections. We 
present all o f  the repertoires we have fi)tmd, even though some of 
them are l ikely to be more useful in persuading users to 
participate in the required manner than others: 
1. A l legiance:  Basically. the way I see it, obviously, my main 
allegiance is to the department at the moment, rather than 
the College, because that's where I 've been fo r  god knows 
how long, so from my point o f  vi.;w protecting that account 
and the emaii that comes to and from that account is more 
important than the college facilities that I use. 
2. Previous break- ins:  I maintain t.~e highest level o f  personal 
security I can on that because that has been hacked before. 
3. Fol lowing pol icy: But, ahm, arut I think I have this sort o f  
back in my head, I have this sort o f  feel ing 'Oh. l 'm in the 
office, It 's office policy. You l~.~ow, there is a, there is a 
culture here, a security culture, definitely. 
4. Avoid personal embarrassment: or  i f  it was the network 
password, it could certainly be embarrassing in terms of, 
f i rst  o f  all people getting the impression that {name o f  
speaker} was doing illegal things within the network and 
maybe sending out bizarre emaih: or viruses to people which 
would then be, probably, succeeded by the realization that 
[name o f  speaker) actually wa~.rn "t a malicious individual 
himself, but he'd been stupid enough to let his account being 
hacked into by someone who has, I mean, there would be an 
amount o f  sympathy, but also, p~ople would get a bit tired 







your lax security that somehow allowed people to do this. 
So, embarrassment, probably, it's unlikely that it would 
bankrupt me, or lose me my job, fo r  example. 
Respect for other people: /f, /.f something, something 
deal ing with people matters, say, an appraisal, a 
performance review, all those things have to be kept 
confidential. 
Pr ivacy:  I don't really have anything on it that l would die i f  
someone gained access to but it's just  the thought o f  it. you 
know it's my, it's my desktop, it "s my setup, it's my files, I 
don "t want anybody reading them. But they're not o f  a highly 
confidential manner, no. 
Paaswords  are  actual ly secure :  I think an eight-digit, sort 
o f  arbitrary password is, I think it's pretty secure, to be 
honest with you. 
Confidence in data :  At the moment, because I 've got, I 
don't, I 'm not working on anything that I would deem to be 
confidential, I wouldn't mind anybody actually looking in to 
what I 'm doing. I think I 'd  be upset i f  anybody else actually 
went in and wrote over my work, which ix probably why the 
password is actually a benefit. But apart from that, that is... 
Financial matters: No, yeah, because it's personal, you 
know, it has my bank balance, my bank transactions, the 
money I earn. 
It  would be hard to defend myself: 
> Well, that would be really hard. because, ahm, 1 have 
got some o f  them written down, in a, in a sort o f  place 
that, i f  somebody really wanted to, they could fina[ so. [ 
think it would be quite hard to defend myself. Q But 
which angle would you take? A Mmmm... 1 really 
don't. L gosh, I don "t know. I don't know how I could 
defend myself. The fact  that I 've written them down for  
anybody to find... 1, l just  don't know, don't know. I 'd 
have to think quite hard about that one. Q Okay. I 
think what a lot o f  people just  say is "1 would just  say: 
okay, that's what everybody does. ', so... A Oohh. 
Yeah, but it, just  because veryone lse does it... 
> First o f  all, i f  somebody hacked in through my account 
into somebody else "s account, then my account name 
will appear on the hacking record or whatever, and 
therefore I wil l  be blamed fo r  it. I won't  be held 
responsible i f  my system wax too easy to get into or i l l  
had a easy-to-guess password. I 'm sure the regulations 
say my password should be changed frequently and 
should be hard to guess. And it isn't. And therefore i f  
somebody had broken in through it, I could be held 
responsible, I guess. 
2.3 The Shar ing Culture: Why Social 
Engineering Is a No-Brainer 
In this section we will investigate the actual situations in which 
participants hared passwords, and show that there is a social 
component that currently makes it difficult for many people to 
refuse a request o disclose their password. In addition, there are 
common criteria that determine whether a request to disclose 
one's password is successful or not. The point we want to make 
here is that the reasons for sharing passwords, and the criteria 
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underlying the decision to disclose passwords, offer ideal entry 
points for hackers and induslrial spies using social engineering 
techniques. Finally, we point out repertoires that increase 
resistance todisclosing one's password. 
2.3.1 In what  s ituations do people disclose 
passwords? 
There are a number of situations that lead to password isclosure. 
Indusl3"ial spies can easily exploit some of these, and hackers can 
attempt to engineer situations that allow them to ask someone lse 
to disclose their password: 
1. Have somebody access your account: I've also had to give 
my password to another colleague, because l had to go home 
and had some urgent emi l ,  but I couldn't, I don't have 
access to email at home, so I gave that person my password 
and they checked my email far me. 
2. Nccossary for work: There's beer~ when we do experiments, 
it's often to set, to set up the computer in order to do an 
experiment, we sometimes have to give each other 
passwords, I mean I've had another colleagues password as 
well. Over the last few days, in order to do an experiment 
because my home directory didn 't have the, the correct poths 
in it. So she gave me hers. 
3. Following higher orders: Right. Okay. Ahhmm, I'd do that if, 
i f  my group leader phoned me up and told me that... 
4. Informal support: Ahm. Well, ahm, because I'm computer- 
illiterate, ahm, I have to have a trusted friend who can help 
me out, so, ahm, one of  the young people in the team who is 
very, very good at figgling around with PCs has sort of  taken 
me under her wing. And I usually manage to f ind someone 
who does that for me, wherever I go, so, ahm, so o f  course I
let her have my password, so she can get onto my PC and 
change things and do things. 
5. Organized sharing: what we do is, we actually, ahm, inside 
our group, we write, write down passwords that are deemed 
to be important, and we put them in sealed envelopes, and 
they're in our head of  group "s filing cabinet locked away. 
2. 3.2 'Don "t you trust me ?' The social component 
One important finding is that password isclosure is sccn as a sign 
of trust between colleagues - and the refusal to disclose as a sign 
of lack of Izust (I'm dodgy. Like I'm dodgy. Would they have had 
a good reason? I think intellectually I could understand why 
someone would want to not tell anyone their password but I think 
I'm trustworthy and I would take it as a personal insult i f  a 
situation arised.., had arisen... I think I would.., a situation arose 
where I would need to someone's machine to achieve something 
that was important and I couldn "t do it because they refused to 
give me their password, I would consider that to be a little over- 
protective. And I think I 'd feel  a little bit insulted about their 
views about my ability to use that password sensibly. Ahm, 
probably because it comes down to 'Don't you trust me?' Since 
we work together, sort of, on a daily basis.). Someone unwilling 
to participate in this social activity can easily be seen as hiding 
something (Somebody that has something which he's not 
supposed to have. or just very secretive by nature without having 
any reason for it.). 
2.3.3 Criteria underlying the decision to disclose 
one's password 
As we have seen, there are certain situations in which people 
disclose their passwords, and in which it might even be a 
disadvantage in the social context not to. In addition, there seems 
to be a common decision-making process that is based on all or 
some of the following criteria: 
~, Trust is the key criterion: But usually it would just be one or 
two people that I trust, trust more or completely, 1 suppose. 
Ahm. that's not what I mearL With one or two people who. I 
suppose, yeah, I suppose trust is the right word. Ah, it would 
probably, yeah. Yeah, I think that's what I mean.  
~' Trust is often related to proximity: Aaalt trust, I suppose and 
proximity to my, I mean, I 'd choose someone from the group, 
you Imow, the group that I work in. 
~" The danger of sharing is considered: Basically, I see it az  a 
bit o f  an equation, really. Depending on the degree and 
severity o f  the information, depending on how serious the 
consequences o fdisclosare are and there's another variable, 
which is obviously the amount of  trust. I f  you sort of  put it all 
together, you know, that's my implicit sort of  mechanism for 
disclasure. 
~" The importance of sharing to the other person is a criterion - 
do they have a reason to ask for the password? Even i f l  trust 
them, then the second question will apply, whether they are 
doing anything dodgy for  a start. 1 don't want to break the 
law unwittingly. But you know, i.fit was a fairly reasonable 
request, i.e., I need to be able to print something out because 
my pasxword, l 've forgotten my password, [deportment's 
name] expects ome written documentation beforehand and 
it's an emergency, and I've got thisfloppy disc and l just 
need to print it, you know that probably wouldn't bother me 
as much, i f I  knew and trusted them, that would be fine. 
~, An additional criterion can be whether nobody else can help: 
I probably would, if, i l l  couldn't be there to do it myself, on 
their behalf, or there's actually nobody else they could go to 
and it was a particularly important piece o f  information they 
needed to get at. 
2.3.4 Repertoires that increase resistance to 
sharing 
There are a number of repertoires that reduced participants' 
willingness to disclose their passwords - or even completely 
obliterated it. Again, some of  these arc direct antidotes to 
repertoires ncouraging password isclosure: 
). Can always find an alternative way: so, I wouldn't. ~ I  
needed real~ to read my email or something then I would 
f ind another way to do it, not by giving somebody my 
password to access the system. 
~, I don't want to become a suspect : and if something 
happens to that other person's account, then you could be 
somebody who would become, would be a suspect in that 
situation, so I don't try to get information about other 
people's ecurity information or password information other 
than.,, 
). I use this password for several systems: No, it's more a 
case of. I think, what it, I think the reason is because that 
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password, I use. I will use the same password in different 
places. Effectively 1 am giving away, l 'm giving somebody 
else the ability to do things as me. Ahhmm, by giving them 
my password. Now, i f  l used a d~"erent password far  every 
system, that wouldn't  necessarily be a problem, because I
would know the limit o f  the damage, as it were. 
2.4 "I 'm not  a herd": About Proper Behavior 
and Negative Self-Image 
One of  the most interesting issues we discovered in our study was 
the relat ionship between self-image, and security-conscious 
behavior. People who care about security often carry a negative 
image because o f  this. This section summarizes repertoires that 
could be filed in the above sections, but we wanted to keep them 
together because they all carry a very peL'sonal tone: 
A common perception is that only technical ly-or iented 
people understand security issues and care about them. 
Obviously, this is a disincentive for people who don't  want 
to be seen as nerds:  There's a lot o f  people who are 
technologists, and, and they tend to know about things like 
security issues, and they care aboui: them. 
People who am: concerned about security arc often regarded 
as paranoid - even by themselves: 1 suppose general  
personality types. People who wou'.ld want to be more secure. 
I don "t know. That's really a question fo r  psychologists. 
What sort o f  people keep their desAts tidy. What sort o f  people 
comb their hair in the morning..Probably the same sort o f  
people who would not give their passwords away. People 
who are very sort of... either people who are very paranoid 
about breaches o f  seeurify 
They might also be regarded as anal and pedantic: Mmm... 
I 'd  just  think they were very diligent in fol lowing the site "S 
security policy. They're more worried about not to be seen to 
be breaching any security rules. I mear~ some colleagues, 
even though you might work with them, might be particularly 
pedantic on that kind o f  thing, or... 
~" People not disc losing their passwords can be seen as 
unsociable, or might even get the image of  not being team 
p layers :  Completely closed and shuttered own and, not, 
don't want to give away, share, ra~t, not team players, as they 
say. I would say they're those sort o f  people. But yes, but I 
think people who are like that as part o f  their nature, I think 
that's jus t  how they are as people, and they 're, they "re jus t  
not team players at all, jus t  very shuttered and closed, and 
l 'd  probab~ think they "re a bit weird, to be honest. 
~' People not following regulations can be seen as pragmat ic :  I 
think it's, it's interesting, we "re all given hold o f  these 
IxxJrsword, s, and we "re not supposed to share them, but 1 think 
people are more pragmatic about things, so 1 wouldn "t be 
m~rprised i f it happened, so, al~ 
3 . APPL ICAT IONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
In section two, we have presented a htrge number of  interpretative 
repertoires that undermine security-conscinusness, a  wel l  as 
some that increase it. The aim of  s~ay intervention must be to 
make users abstain from the former and employ the latter. The 
approaches to achieving this we pre,~ent here arc changes to the 
mechanisms itself, policies, tutorials, training and the general 
discourse abom passwords. We believe that a combination of  all 
o f  these wi l l  prove most  effect ive, though 'pretty  good 
persuasion' can be achieved without changing the mechanism 
itself. 
3.1 Methods  Not  Requ i r ing  Changes  to 
Policies or the Mechanism Itself 
3.1.1 Changes to the discourse about password 
mechanisms 
The interpretative repertoires we have presented co-exist as a 
complex, entangled web within individual users. Any discourse 
about password mechanisms, for example in tutorials and training, 
should obviously introduce and reinforce the desired repertoires. 
In addition, it should use those repertoires that act as antidotes to 
undesirable ones. An example would be to point out that any 
break-in into an employee 's  account might result in personal 
embarrassment (avoid personal embarrassment) in order to 
combat he general bel ief  that no personal danger can be caused 
by such break-ins. 
A further interesting area o f  future research would be the 
deployment o f  an adequate metaphor for the whole password 
mechanism that counteracts some of  the repertoires that 
undermine proper security behaviors.  One metaphor we are 
currently investigating in the context o f  private users is the 
'burglar alarm'. As with password mechanisms, users of  burglar 
alarms are aware of  the fact that they can ultimately not keep out a 
highly determined intruder. Still, most house owners install 
burglar alarms in order to make it as difficult as possible for the 
intruder to get in. In the scenario we are corrently investigating, 
we are pointing out that attackers o f  computer systems wil l  
ult imately go for the easiest arget - which means that a person 
employing proper password practice does not fight the intruder, 
but competes with other users to be better-protected then them, so 
the intruder attacks them, not her/him. This idea is equivalent to 
the situation with burglar alarms, and might be conveyed easily by 
using this metaphor. 
3.1.2 Social marketing for social people 
An important result o f  our study are the social and self- image 
issues we have discovered. An interesting and promising area o f  
future research is the possible use o f  concepts and methods from 
social market ing in order to associate positive qualities with 
proper password practice, and negative ones with bad password 
practice. One example would be an advert is ing campaign 
depicting people behaving properly as professional and caring 
about their organization, and those behaving improperly as highly 
unprofessional nd anti-social in that they put their colleagues at 
risk. 
3.2 I f  There  Is  no Reason  to Be  Secur i ty -  
Conscious,  Create One:  A Different Way 
of Using Fear Appeals 
The findings in section 2. !. show that many users do not expect o 
suffer personal consequences from improper password behavior. 
Current security policics tend to threaten punishment for improper 
password praztice, hut these are hardly ever enforced. It is l ikely 
that the actual enforcement of  these policies would meet with 
resistance among users, considering that most of  them do not 
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believe there to be any reaaon to be security-conscious in the first 
place. The challenge then is to find a way of creating such a 
reason in a way that meets their acceptance. One such way, which 
wc are currently investigating, is based on a change of policies 
and the way they are enforced, intertwined with a justification for 
this change that slresses the danger to the organization rather than 
the individual. The change we are investigating is based on the 
following ideas: 
1. Present he danger as one of the organization's reputation 
being tarnished if it were to be known to the outside world 
that its employees did not behave in a security-conscious 
fashion. Depending on the type of the organization, this 
might focus on issues such as ensuring that customers' data 
is kept secure. This gives the fear appeal (and its associated 
punishment) a rational motivation that will raise users' 
acceptaneo of it. 
Punish non-compliant behavior if it is careless, rather than 
due to a lack of knowledge and support 
2. 
3. Be seen to punish such behavior. 
3.3 Changes to the Password Mechanism 
Itself 
The following is a radical scenario that we are currently 
investigating in focus groups in order to determine the 
effectiveness of its individual elements: 
1. The system hands out to each user a unique password that 
can not be changed. 
2. In addition, the user is given instructions at the time of 
receiving the password on how to memorize it. 
3. The user can log into his system using the password alone - 
no user id is needed. 
4. In case the user forgets his/her password, it takes 24 hours to 
be allocated anew one. 
5. The password is changed only at long intervals, e.g. every six 
months or more. 
The aim of these changes is to associate the password closer with 
its user -  since s/he can log in with the password alone, anyone 
finding a written copy of it can abuse it. Since it is changed only 
at long intervals, anyone this password is disclosed to has access 
to the system for a long time. In addition, it is made inconvenient 
to get a new password, thus increasing the importance of the 
password, putting it on par with a key that is not replaced instantly 
either. 
4. CONCLUSION 
We have put forward an argument that can be summarized as 
follows: 
I. Password mechanisms and their users form a socio-technical 
system whose aim it is to achieve security. 
2. Users' willingness to make the extra effort that security- 
conscious behavior requires is a vital variable influencing the 
effectiveness ofthis system. 
3. Users cannot be forced to behave in a proper fashion, but an 
effort o persuade them to do so has to be made. 
4. Systems, policies, tutorials, trainings and the general 
discourse about password mechanisms have to be designed 
with their persuasive power in mind. 
5. Pretty Good Privacy can be achieved without changing the 
mechanisms themselves, though optimal results will only be 
obtainable by complete redesign. 
We have given the results of a first study that can be used to guide 
the development of persuasive methods. In addition, we haw 
given first ideas on which methods might deserve specific 
research attention in the future. Finally, we would like to slress 
that the applicability of 'pretty good persuasion' is not restricted 
to password mechanisms, but is likely to increase the 
effectiveness ofother security mechanisms a  well. 
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